Theoretical Physics

15 January 2014
Time: 15:00 to 16:00
Location: EC Stoner SR 7.83

Marcos Curty (Vigo, Spain)

Taming side-channels in quantum cryptography



Despite its often praised unconditional security, quantum key distribution (QKD) also relies on assumptions. Some of them are quite natural, such as the validity of quantum mechanics, the existence of true random number generators, or the assumption that the legitimate users are well shielded from the eavesdropper. Other assumptions, such as considering that the honest parties have an accurate and complete description of their physical devices, are more severe. Obviously, if the functioning of the real setup differs from that considered in the mathematical model, this may become completely vulnerable to new types of attacks not covered by the security proof. Indeed, quantum hacking against commercial QKD systems, particularly detector side channel attacks, have emerged as a hot topic. Here, we discuss the current solutions (together with its assumptions, strengths and weaknesses) to overcome the problem of side-channels in QKD

 

 

<- Back to: External Seminars